The New DOJ: Lessons Learned from the Ticketmaster Live Nation Decision by Meese, Alan J.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Popular Media Faculty and Deans
2004
The New DOJ: Lessons Learned from the
Ticketmaster Live Nation Decision
Alan J. Meese
ajmees@wm.edu
Copyright c 2004 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media
Repository Citation
Meese, Alan J., "The New DOJ: Lessons Learned from the Ticketmaster Live Nation Decision" (2004). Popular Media. 464.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media/464
By Alan Meese and Barak D. Richman
The New DOJ: Lessons Learned From the Ticketmaster Live
Nation Decision
huffpost.com/entry/resisting-the-politicizat_b_442384
The Obama administration's announcement yesterday to approve, with some modifications,
the merger between Live Nation and Ticketmaster marked a fittingly undramatic end to
what many hoped would be the watershed to a new economic policy. The administration's
decision instead reflected a commitment to principle over politics and pragmatism over
populism.
Many hoped that the Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger would fall prey to a new economic
populism. When the companies announced their plans to merge, some characterized the
merger as a consolidation of "entertainment powerhouses" designed to inflate ticket prices
and squeeze consumers. Public figures, including none other than Bruce Springsteen,
condemned the combination. Members of Congress piled on, characterizing the transaction
as a naked combination of industrial titans and demanding action from antitrust enforcers.
The history of antitrust policy is replete with such populist anger towards supposed
industrial power, and the Sherman Act itself was largely created in response to a screaming
public. Typical demands for rigorous enforcement come from small and technologically
obsolete companies resisting the onslaught of new competitive forces. Typical demands for
restrained enforcement come from politically-connected professional establishments that
disdain competition and decry enforcement as unwanted government interference. This
politicization of antitrust, from all ideological corners, rarely results in sound economic
policy and has led both to overzealous enforcement, protecting inefficient firms from more
efficient rivals, and to permissive restraints, giving sanction to destructive cartels and
monopolies.
The Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger would have been another procompetitive victim to an
angry public. Our careful analysis of the proposed merger reveals that it is much more a
response to Schumpeterian technological change than an effort to concentrate market
power. In other words, the companies are combining forces to pursue an innovative
business model, one that pursues new consumer demands and responds to the rise of
electronic music. It is not an attempt to acquire a stranglehold over an industry that
technological change has made increasingly resistant to strangleholds.
The populist anger directed at the proposed merger -- which was in no small part fueled by
the companies' smaller competitors who feared having difficulty competing effectively
against the new company-- characteristically did not discern the complexities of the industry
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and evaluate the merger's likely competitive impact. Of course, few in Washington brake for
complexity. Which is why it is a relief the Obama administration did.
Despite being ridiculed as "the dismal science," economics is a necessary ingredient to
policies that enhance consumer welfare and disperse the plentiful benefits of market
competition. Even while the Obama Administration might engage in antitrust saber rattling,
its approval the Live Nation-Ticketmaster and the associated consent decree shows the
triumph of economic reasoning that is often counterintuitive to policy advocates. Its
settlement further extracts concessions that further enhances competition, promotes
innovation, and protects consumers. It is the commendable product of careful analysis
reflects a deliberate navigation across the minefield of antitrust politicization.
While reasonable minds might differ with both our own analysis of the merger and the
administration's conclusion, such differences should focus on the merits the transaction
and not rhetoric from politicos. Bruce Springsteen himself admonished all of us to avoid
leaping to compulsive conclusions when he observed, "God have mercy on the man who
doubts what he's sure of." Effective antitrust requires nothing less.
Alan Meese is the Ball Professor of Law at William and Mary. Barak Richman is a Professor of Law
and Business at Duke University.
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